The current understanding about how households respond to price changes in formal childcare is not extensive. This study examines this response through a 1998 reform in Norway that introduced a money transfer to families who did not send their child to childcare. This cash-for-care reform raised the price of formal childcare relative to its alternatives by about 115% for 1-2 year olds but not 3-5 year olds. Using household surveys conducted before and after the reform the analysis reveals that childcare attendance fell by 13.7 percentage points because of the reform. The results also indicate that the most important alternative to formal childcare is parental care. Furthermore, households of low socioeconomic status are more price sensitive, with the main substitute mode of care for this group being parental/relative care, whereas for high socioeconomic status families the substitutes include day parks and nannies as well as parental care.
Introduction
Nowadays, much childcare takes place outside the family home in many European countries. For the youngest children, attendance rates at formal childcare are especially high in the Nordic countries. (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 2016). Extensive public subsidization of the childcare sector has facilitated the expansion in childcare attendance rates, with public funding supported by arguments that formal childcare has beneficial effects for both parental employment and the children themselves.
1
Parents making decisions on the form of childcare used face a number of considerations. Labour market attachment, childcare quality assessments, childcare availability, and price are all components that can influence the decision process about the form of childcare. Nevertheless, given that formal childcare has beneficial effects for the children and their mothers, it is of great importance for both policy makers and researchers to know how parents respond to price changes in formal childcare. Child care subsidies are costly to the tax payers. Furthermore, subgroups in the population might respond differently to price changes. Given the importance of the question, it is safe to say that the number of studies analyzing this is fairly limited -possible because few studies have isolated large shocks to childcare prices unaccompanied by other (non-price) changes and examined their consequences. Evidence on the subject remains scarce because of either a lack of data or suitable natural experiments, and more work on this question is needed. In light of recent emphasis of the importance of childcare and other early influences on later life outcomes, our main contribution is to add evidence on how price sensitive parents are to changes in childcare prices, and show results on the conse- 1 For a discussion on the effects of public childcare on parental employment, see Lundin et al. (2008) , Mogstad and Havnes (2011), Baker et al. (2008) , Lefebre and Merrigan (2008) , Bettendorf et al. (2015) and Bauernschuster and Schlotter (2015) . A recent survey on the literature of the effects of childcare on children can be found in Heckman and Mosso (2014) .
1 quences of a price change in formal childcare for other care arrangements. In addition to this, how parents respond to price changes in childcare may provide a glimpse into the motivation behind intra-household caregiving (Grossbard (2014) , Becker (1981) ).
It will then give a perspective on the role of altruism versus monetary incentives in intra-household decisions regarding caregiving for young children.
Apossiblewayto studyresponsesto changesinchildcarepricesisto analyzechanges in childcare subsidies. However, this method has some limitations. For example, childcare subsidies tend to be means tested, which complicates the interpretation of any effects, and using subsidy eligibility cut-offs necessarily limits the validity of any effect to some specific subpopulation. As an alternative, we propose to use the introduction of a particular type of policy, namely, a cash-for-care (CFC) benefit reform, to examine how households respond to price changes for childcare in a way that does not suffer from these limitations. The Norwegian data provide an almost ideal context to investigate the question of how households respond to price changes in formal childcare. The introduction of the CFC reform was not followed by tax cuts nor transfers, i.e. no simultaneous changes in income. Neither was the refor m foll owed by changes in means testing. Furthermore, the capacity was unchanged, i.e. the CFC reform affected only the demand, and not the supply of formal daycare. Finally, the introduction of the CFC reform was introduced at the same time in whole Norway. Thus, our analysis does not suffer from potential biases from unobserved characteristics that may vary if one would do a analysis between different states. The CFC benefit was available in Norway for 1-year-old children from 1 August 1998 and for 2-year-old children from 1 January 1999 . The reform would eventually provide 3,000 Norwegian kroner (NOK) per month to parents choosing not to send their 1-2-year-old children to formal childcare providers receiving public funds. 2 As the benefit was unavailable for 3-5 year olds, we employ difference-in- 2 1 NOK ⇡ 0.122 USD.
2 differences (DID) estimation to compare the rates of childcare for eligible and ineligible children before and after the introduction of the reform. Thus, our treatment group and our control group are extremely similar.
At the time of the reform, the average monthly price for a municipal childcare seat in Norway was about 2,600 NOK for a middle-income household; thus, the reform represented a nearly 115% price increase for formal childcare relative to any other forms of childcare, which is quite significant. 3 For this reason, the CFC reform may yield valuable information on how price sensitive parents are to the price of formal childcare in general, as well as what the alternative modes of care is. It may also highlight the price sensitivity of particular subgroups in the population as there may be many reasons why some demographic groups are more likely to receive the CFC benefit and less likely to send their children to formal childcare. This paper attempts to address this issue by separating the effect of the benefit for groups of different socioeconomic status (SES).
Some literature have already estimated the effect of childcare prices on childcare attendance. The most recent contributions use policy reforms or rules that provide exogenous shocks to childcare prices and study its impact. 4 For example, Baker et al.
(2008) examined a reform in the childcare sector in Quebec that included a generous childcare subsidy that set the price of childcare at just 5 Canadian dollars per day.
After comparing childcare attendance in Quebec to the rest of Canada, before and after the reform, Baker et al. (2008) found that childcare use increased, while there was a shift from care by relatives and non-licensed non-relatives. An important factor that separates that study from the current analysis is that the childcare subsidy coincided 3 Eibak (2002) reports results from a survey conducted in 2002. Private childcare centers had somewhat higher prices. Middle income households refers to households with a yearly income of 250 000 -375 000 NOK 4 An older literature estimates the price elasticities of childcare, including Blau and Hagy (1998), Powell (2002) and Connelly and Kimmel (2003) . These studies report price elasticities ranging from -0.3 to -1. A contribution of this analysis relative to that literature is the use of a different identification strategy.
with an expansion in childcare capacity. Therefore, Baker et al. (2008) did not isolate the effect of the subsidy on childcare attendance. Another separating feature is that prior to the reform identified in Baker et al. (2008) , other childcare subsidies depended on family income. The effective price change in childcare following the new program therefore also depended on family income. In contrast, the CFC subsidy in Norway is uniform for all families, which makes it easier to more directly interpret and compare any price responses.
Gathmann and Sass (2012) is closest in spirit to the present analysis because it also used a nationwide population survey to analyze the consequences of the introduction of a CFC program, but in a single German state. As the benefit applied in only one state, a factor that separates our studies is that Gathmann and Sass (2012) mainly compared the childcare outcomes in the reform state relative to those in other states, whereas we compared the childcare outcomes for eligible and ineligible children across different ages. However, the development of the childcare sector may be different in various states in Germany, and if so, this invalidates the key identification when doing a DID analysis. In contrast, our study examines the development of a control and treatment group in a childcare sector under the same contexts before and after the reform.
As an alternate, Black et al. (2014) considered the consequences of childcare subsidies by utilizing the fact that eligibility depends on sharp family income cut-offs.
By comparing families immediately below and right above the income cut-offs, they found, among other things, that there was no effect of the subsidy on formal childcare attendance for children aged 5 years.
One explanation for this finding is that there is an excessive demand for childcare, which is therefore price inelastic. Another possible explanation is that information about the subsidy is not easily available to parents before they actually apply for childcare. Lastly, an important point when comparing the analysis in Black et al. (2014) to ours is that the subsidy eligibility cut-offs they considered were for 5-year-old children, while the children in our study are much younger (1-2 year-olds).
Other studies that have specifically looked at the Norwegian CFC reform have mostly focused on the effects of maternal labour force participation. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the institutional framework for the CFC policy. Section 3 describes the data and details the econometric model used in the analysis. Section 4 reports and discusses the results and Section 5 concludes.
Institutional Setting
The development of a public childcare sector in Norway relates to the increase in female labour market participation. In the mid-1960s, few mothers were active labour market participants, and correspondingly there were relatively few childcare centers. As female labour participation accelerated in the 1970s, there was a corresponding increase in childcare attendance. In the early stages of the development of a public childcare sector in Norway, the focus was on giving alternatives to older children (those aged 3-6 years). As shown by The 1990s were subject to two reforms other than the CFC reform that could have consequences for the public childcare sector. In 1993, maternity leave extended up until the child turned 1 year old, and in 1997, a process of including 6 year olds in the school system was finalized. These reforms in effect excluded two cohorts of children from childcare. However, while the maternity leave reform may have had only small consequences for the childcare market, especially as few 1 year olds or younger attended childcare, the school starting-age reform would have had much larger implications for the childcare market. There were three main purposes of the CFC reform: (i) provide more freedom of 6 We discuss these findings in Section 4.1.
choice to parents of the form of childcare, (ii) provide parents with more time to be with their children, and (iii) to redistribute funds to families that did not receive services from heavily subsidized childcare providers (Kontantstøtteloven 1998). The eligibility criteria for the CFC benefit are nationally regulated. Appendix Table A .2 shows that there have been some changes to the law over time concerning the size and age criteria, but the main features of the benefit have remained largely the same, with the benefit paid to parents of children aged 1-2 years old who do either not or only partially attend childcare that receives public funding. The subsidy is granted to the parent with whom the child lives. Parents need to apply for the benefit, and it can be paid for up to 3 months prior to application if the eligibility criteria were fulfilled during the period.
Data and econometric approach
The data are from national living standard surveys administered in the spring of 1998, The surveys were conducted using self-reported questionnaire and telephone interviews.
Parents may respond to the reform by changing the amount of time in formal childcare, and the decision to enter the child into childcare and not. Since the questions only indicate attendance at a particular care alternative, we are analyzing the consequences on the extensive margin.
The respondents were drawn from mothers with preschool-aged children. As the surveys were intended to study the CFC reform, additional mothers with CFC-eligible children were drawn for each survey. For the survey conducted during spring 1998, only 1 year olds were considered CFC eligible, whereas for the surveys in 1999 and 2002, both 1 and 2 year olds were considered CFC eligible. To adjust for differences in the survey draw process, age dummies are included in all regressions.
Data from 1998 were collected by drawing a sample of 3,500 observations from the population of mothers with preschool-aged children, for which 84.9% of the mothers chose to respond. In the 1999 survey, 3,848 women were drawn, of which 86.6 % responded. For the 2002 survey, 3,886 mothers with preschool-aged children were drawn, of which 86.8% chose to respond. We start with a sample containing childcare information on the first-and second-born children of the respondents in the household survey.
We choose to concentrate on the married/cohabiting households. To get a valid control group, we exclude children aged 3-5 with CFC eligible siblings. We then excluded information on those children aged under 1 year and older than 5 years, leaving us with a baseline sample of 6,763 children.
[Insert Table 1 here]
Descriptive statistics for the sample are reported in Table 1. The table provides Income is measured in NOK. We note that the parents of 1-2 year olds and those of the 3-5 year olds appear similar in terms of background characteristics. For the subgroup analysis, we should also note that the immigrant population represents a relatively small proportion of the sample. We therefore expect the estimates for this group to be somewhat noisy. Panel B details the proportion of children across the different types of care arrangements. The biggest difference between the care of 1-2 and 3-5 year olds is that many more of the older group are in childcare.
Appendix Table A .3 compares the proportion in formal childcare as judged from the survey with the official coverage rates. As shown, the rates we retrieve from the household surveys generally correspond with the official figures, but are slightly lower.
We interpret this small discrepancy as resulting from the different definitions of childcare attendance. In the survey, we define care attendance as the proportion of parents To analyze the effect of the CFC reform on formal childcare attendance, we could compare formal childcare rates before and after the reform for eligible children. However, there could be underlying trends in formal childcare attendance rates for 1-2 year olds that have little or nothing to do with the CFC reform. To overcome this, we compare the change in formal childcare rates for eligible children to the change in formal childcare rates for ineligible children. The difference in the change in childcare rates is then attributed to the reform. The following DID approach is specified as:
where subscript i indexes the individual family child and t indexes time. The dependent variable Y it is a binary variable equal to one if the parents responded that the daytime caregiver for their child is a formal childcare centre, and zero otherwise. the effect the year after the reform was implemented), while 5 , captures the long-run effect (being the effect 3 years after the reform was fully implemented).
Controls it consists of a set of control variables. The controls are the logarithms of the mother's and father's incomes, the immigrant dummy, child age dummies, dummies for the mother's and father's educational level (lower secondary, upper secondary, college and university), and regional dummies (Oslo (Oslo, and Akershus), east excluding Oslo/Akershus (Hedmark, Oppland, Østfold, Vestfold, Buskerud and Telemark), southwest (Vest-Agder, Aust-Agder and Rogaland), west (Hordaland and Sogn-og Fjordane), middle (Sør-Tr. and Nord-Tr.), and north (Nordland, Troms, and Finnmark)). Finally, " it is the error term. To correct for intragroup correlation in the error terms, standard errors are clustered at region-age level.
Results
The main results are reported in Table 2 . The table provides estimates of the coefficients for 4 and 5 in our DID model using equation (1), i.e., the short-and long-run effects.
Starting with the results in Column (1) which included all children, we obtain a negative significant coefficient of -13.2 percentage points in the short run, and a negative and statistically significant coefficient of -13.7 percentage points in the long run.
[Insert Table 2 here]
In Column (2), we concentrate on the youngest age group and therefore exclude 2-year-old children from the treatment group. Similarly, in Column (3), we focus on those 2-year-old children and exclude 1-year-old children. Comparing the results in Columns (2) and (3), we can see the effects for younger children are much stronger in both the short and long run. The estimates suggest that other factors that altruism explain care decisions even for very young children.
[Insert Table 3 here] Table 3 Increased use of part time care is a possible reason for why the point estimates of the effects on the four alternatives to formal childcare in sum are larger than the negative effect on formal childcare.
8 Table A .4 in the Appendix provides the short-run coefficients.
An interesting observation is that even though "Relative care" is an important care alternative for children, there is no observed increase in this type of care arrangement following the reform. There are several possible explanations. It could be that demand for this type of care is particularly inelastic, or that relative care is a complement to formal childcare. An alternative explanation is that relative care is an inferior good.
Comparing the results in Columns (2) and (3), an observation is that "Parental care" is more important as an alternative care option for childcare for 1-year-old children than 2-year-old children, which is also consistent with the descriptive analysis reported in Table 1 .
Columns (4)- (6) provide the results for low-SES children, while columns (7)- (9) show the results for high-SES children. Comparing the results for the two subgroups shows that a difference is that the main alternative for formal childcare is parental care for low-SES children, while the alternative forms of care are more mixed for high-SES children. Nanny care and alternatives included in the "Other" category are both important alternatives for the latter group. We also note that a significant negative coefficient shows up for "Relatives" for the high-SES group, suggesting that it is either a complement of formal childcare or and inferior good for this group. In contrast, the short run effects reported in Table A.4 shows an increase in the use of relative care for 1-year-olds of low SES parents.
[Insert Table 4 here] Table 4 provides estimates of the long run coefficient, 5 , for the SES and immigrant status subgroups. The motivation behind this is to explore whether particular subgroups are more or less sensitive to a price change in childcare. Column (1) details the estimates for all children in subgroups, while Columns (2) and (3) detail the estimates by child age. Panel A splits children into groups based on SES. Low SES children experience a much stronger response to the reform than high SES children. The de-rived elasticities will be even larger for low SES children because the initial utilization is much lower (see Table 1 ). There is an argument that the CFC benefit redistributes to low-SES households since a lower proportion of children in these households attends childcare. Childcare is a in-kind public good that affects the distribution of (extended)
income in the population (Aaberge and Langøren (2006)). The total distributional effect of the CFC reform must take into account both the direct redistribution, the effect on parental labor force participation, and the effect of change in childcare use.
9
In Panel C, the sample is stratified by mother's immigration status. The results for non-immigrants are almost identical to the main results, while the results for immigrants differ somewhat. We obtain a relatively large and significant coefficient for 1-year-old children, but not for all eligible children or 2 year olds. This could be explained by the small sample size and the corresponding decrease in precision.
Robustness
Identification relies on a common trend in childcare rates over time for 1-2 year olds [Insert Figure 1 here] 9 Another perspective on distributional effects is how the CFC affects well-being across the income distribution (Burton and Phipps (2007) ). Both income and parental time may affect family well-being, and low-SES families may gain more in terms of these factors. This can be an explanation for the observed estimates. Furthermore, the CFC benefit is a transfer to family households. The benefit will increase income inequalities between family and non-family housholds for men (see for instance Kunze (2016) ).
14
The trends in formal childcare attendance for 1-2 and 3-5 year olds moved very closely together before the reform. 10 Childcare rates for 1-2 year olds then increased on average 3.5 percentage points each year from 1990-1997, while those for 3-5 year olds increased at 3.2 percentage points each year for the same period. 11 The bump in coverage rate in 1997 is likely the result of the school starting-age reform that excluded a full cohort from childcare. Finally, the increase in the attendance rate tapers off from 1997 to 2000 for 1-2 year olds.
12 Figure 1 suggests that the childcare growth rate for 3-5 year olds slows somewhat after the CFC reform. The yearly increase before the reform was 3.2 percentage points, while after the reform it was 2.1 percentage points. 13 There are three main explanations for this. First, children with siblings in childcare age could be affected by the reform.
Since we exclude this group from the treatment group, our main estimate based on the household surveys are unaffected by this. Second, the school starting-age reform excluded a full cohort of children from childcare from the 1997 onwards, and thus saturated the market for childcare slots sometime after 1997. The spike in attendance in 1997 provides some evidence in support. This would explain the lower growth rates in childcare after the reform among 3-5 year olds observed in Table 1 , but would not affect identification under the assumption that it influenced 1-2 and 3-5 year olds in the same manner. The observed common pre trends support this theory. Lastly, there could be 10 Note that the observed common pre-trends reported in Figure 1 are for formal childcare rates. Preferably, we would have like to have similar rates for the use of parental, relative or nanny care, but such information is not available.
11 A t-test on the difference in mean yearly changes in the pre-reform period between the two groups shows that they are not statistically different. Inference based on this test is valid if we assume that the yearly rate changes are independent.
12 From 1999, "open childcare" providers were no longer included as attending childcare. In 1998, children in these centers represented about 2% of all children in childcare (Statistics Norway 2005).
13 Testing for the difference in mean yearly changes in the pre-and post-reform periods using a regression with Newey-West standard errors show that they are statistically different.
14 Appendix Table A long-term effects of the CFC reform on the children affected. Children aged 3-5 after the reform could have been affected by the CFC reform since they were eligible when they were younger. We assess that any bias arising for this source should be small. In any case, this should not affect the short-term coefficients since it is measured shortly after the implementation of the reform. We conclude that 3-5 year olds without eligible siblings are unaffected by the reform, and thus comprise a valid control group.
The observed common pre trends are our main identification-test. Another way to explore whether the results reported in Table 2 are driven by factors other than the CFC reform is to run some simple regressions, as shown in equation (2) . Differential trends in the observable variables would indicate that something other than the reform could explain the change in attendance rates. (2) [Insert Table 5 here] Table 5 provides the results. The only significant difference is the likelihood of mother attending university, with six percentage points more university educated mothers found among 1-2 year olds than 3-5 year olds in 1999 than in 1998 in our sample.
The coefficient is only significant at the 10 per cent significance level, something that could be expected given the number of estimated placebo coefficients had there been no difference.
Our study may also be invalidated because not all the randomly drawn mothers responded to the survey and this may relate to the extent families were affected by the reform. For example, if high-SES mothers were more likely to respond to the survey, and these mothers are less affected by the subsidy, it could bias the estimated effect of the CFC benefit downwards. Further, if immigrant mothers who were more proficient in Norwegian were more likely to respond to the survey and less likely affected by the CFC subsidy, this would also weaken the results for this group. Table A.6 in the Appendix compares the education level of the mothers in the sample to the official statistics for women aged 30-34 years in 2000. Even though the two groups are not directly comparable, and one is self-reported and the other administrative, we note that the sample of mothers we used appears to be more highly educated. This is true for both non-immigrant and immigrant mothers. The subgroup estimations by SES and immigrant status reported in Table 4 suggest that the main estimates for the response to reform are higher for the sample population.
We are fortunate to have childcare attendance measurements from two sources:
administrative childcare rates and household surveys. Thus, one way to validate our results from the surveys is to compare them to estimates based on administrative data. Figure 1 in the Appendix detail the administrative rates. As the administrative data are reported at the end of year, the pre-reform rate we used is from 1997 as the reform was implemented in August 1998. The surveys were conducted during spring each year. Computing the long-run DID coefficient yield an estimate of the effect of the CFC reform of -9.3 percentage points.
15 Given that the rates are based on slightly different measures of formal childcare attendance, this is not too far from the survey estimate of -13.7 percentage points. As discussed, the lower estimate using administrative data could be because the control group using administrative data is not valid, or that the survey population is not fully comparable.
Assuming formal childcare is a normal good, the substitution effect should decrease the demand for formal childcare, whereas the income effect will shift demand in the other direction. Depending on the size of the income effect, our estimate will then underestimate the effect of a regular increase in the formal childcare price. Assuming no income effects, the (compensated) price elasticity of formal childcare is estimated to be -0.354. 16 If the other care alternatives are normal goods and substitutes for formal childcare, the substitution and income effect should both shift demand in the same direction.
A final aspect to consider concerning the validity of the estimates is the reform environment at the time of implementation. A concern here would be the existence of capacity constraints in the childcare market. In 1997, the school starting-age reform effectively reduced the number of children in childcare by a full cohort. This suggests that the capacity of childcare spaces in the following period were not constrained. Thus, our estimates are unlikely to be driven by capacity constraints in the childcare market.
The fact that there are fewer 1-2 year olds to compete for seats with because of the reform, would then not affect the 3-5 year olds, since there were already free capacity.
17
Of course, it would be useful to compare our measurement of the price sensitivity of formal childcare to other causal estimates in the literature. Baker et al. (2008) obtains a price elasticity of -0.58 for 0-4 year olds in Canada. This is of much larger magnitude than our estimate, and we suspect part of the reason is that the Canadian reform included additional measures aimed at increasing the use of childcare other than the introduction of a subsidy. In contrast, Gathmann and Sass (2012) estimate a compensated own-price elasticity of -0.30, which is much closer to our estimate. However, their estimates of the impacts on informal childcare alternatives differ somewhat from our. They do find that parental care increases with the CFC benefit but find no impact on the use of nannies or "child-minders" while they do find a strong negative effect for care provided by friends/relatives. The different estimates could be explained by cross-country differences in childcare systems. Lastly, Kornstad and Thoresen (2007) estimate an elasticity for childcare of -0.12 for preschool-aged children (1-6 years) while Black et al. (2014) are unable to reject the null hypothesis of no effect on childcare use for the childcare subsidy for 5-year-old children. Such inelastic demand for childcare for groups of older children is consistent with our finding that the demand for formal childcare for younger children is more elastic than that for older children.
Conclusion
This study has focused on the effect of a price change on formal childcare attendance. alternative. Column (1) includes all children, while Column (2) includes 1-year-old children, and column (3) includes 2-year-old children. Column (4)-(6) provides the results for low-SES children, while Column (7)- (9) provides the results for high-SES children. Control variables are the log of self-reported parental income, education level, region dummies, immigrant status, age dummies, and married/cohabiting dummy. Standard errors clustered at region-age level and shown in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 Standard errors clustered at region-age level and shown in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
